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2	EASTERN DISTRICT OF M.	ISSOURI, EASTERN DIVISION, ST. LOUIS
3	COTTER CORPORATION N.S.	.L.,)
4	Plaint	Lff,)
5	v.) No. 4:19-MC-00774-AGF
6	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al,)	
7	Defendants.)	
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9	RULE 27 HEARING	
10	BEFORE THE HONORABLE AUDREY G. FLEISSIG UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE	
11	UNITED STATES DISTRICT SUDGE	
12	No	OVEMBER 25, 2019
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(THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD ON NOVEMBER 1 25, 2019, BEGINNING AT APPROXIMATELY 4:00 P.M., IN OPEN 2 3 COURT:) THE COURT: Good afternoon. We are here in the 4 5 matter of Cotter Corporation N.S.L. v. United States of America et al. It is case number 4:19-MC-00774-AGF. And 6 7 here in the courtroom on behalf of the plaintiff Cotter 8 Corporation is Mr. John McGahren. And do we have another 9 attorney on behalf of Cotter? Is there anyone else on behalf of Cotter on the phone? 10 11 MR. MCGAHREN: No, Your Honor. 12 THE COURT: And then here in the courtroom we have Phillip Dupre, correct? 13 14 MR. DUPRE: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: And you are here on behalf of the 15 United States; is that correct? 16 17 MR. DUPRE: Correct, Your Honor. 18 THE COURT: Then we have other people here on the 19 telephone on behalf of the United States; is that correct? 20 MR. DAIN: Yes, Your Honor. This is David Dain 21 on behalf of the United States. 22 THE COURT: Anyone else on the telephone on 2.3 behalf of the United States? All right. And then we have on behalf of Republic Services 24 25 Inc., do we have Allyson Cunningham; is that correct by

telephone? 2 MS. CUNNINGHAM: That's correct, Your Honor. 3 THE COURT: Anybody else here in the courtroom or by telephone on behalf of Republic? 4 5 MR. BECK: Your Honor, William Beck on behalf of Republic, Bridgeton Landfill, Allied Services. 6 7 THE COURT: All right. I had you down for 8 Bridgeton but I didn't have you down for all the others. 9 So it's Republic? 10 MR. BECK: Bridgeton, and Allied Services, along with Ms. Cunningham for all three. 11 12 THE COURT: Okay. And then on behalf of Mallinckrodt, Mr. Erickson, do we have you here on the 13 14 phone? 15 MR. ERICKSON: Yes, Your Honor. I'm here with Steve Soden. 16 17 THE COURT: All right. Anybody else either here 18 in the courtroom or by telephone? Who did I miss here? 19 MR. GREENBERG: Judge, Richard Greenberg. here for EverZinc U.S.A. Inc. 20 21 THE COURT: I'm sorry, you're here for who -- I'm 22 sorry, I didn't see a third page here. All right. 2.3 Richard Greenberg for EverZinc. 24 Did we miss anybody? Is there anyone on the 25 telephone who is having trouble hearing me? Now, I just

want to tell you that the folks on the telephone are not going to hear you unless you are at a microphone which makes it real easy for the folks at these two tables but I don't believe that any microphone has been put on that middle table. So just understand, no one is going to hear you when you are speaking unless you come up here and speak at the lectern.

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So I'm not sure how you all want to proceed. I have to be honest with you, I haven't digested everything that you all filed. I didn't realize that this issue was as controversial as it was until Friday, and I've been pretty tied up today. So I've reviewed as much of this as I had time to review. And I think the first question I have for you all is I'm assuming that we are all in agreement that issues with respect to the attorney-client privilege and the scope of it are matters of state law, yes?

MR. MCGAHREN: Your Honor, I have an order that was signed this morning by the --

THE COURT: I understand. I just want to take this one at a time. Does anybody contend that issues with respect to the attorney-client privilege are not matters of state law?

MR. BECK: We do, Your Honor. This is Bill Beck for Bridgeton Landfill, Allied Services, Republic Services.

With respect to the privilege question, Rule 501 provides that federal common law of privilege applies in a federal question case where state law does not supply the rule of decision. The entire purpose of this preservation, the portion of the deposition that's before this Court under Rule 27 is to preserve testimony for claims that will be brought under CERCLA, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act under federal law in federal Court, and it's strictly a federal question So our position is that federal law not state law claim. governs the assertion of privilege with respect to this portion of the deposition. It's being taken simultaneously for a state case and this case, but for Your Honor's portion we believe federal law controls because there's no state rule of decision.

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THE COURT: All right. And do you believe that the federal common law is different than Missouri state law with respect to that?

MR. BECK: We certainly think it's different than the state court judge has applied. We think under the federal common law, the Upjohn case, the communications between attorney and client for the purpose of obtaining legal advice are privileged, and when produced that way it's the subject matter of privilege. The state court took a narrow review under Missouri law and ruled only advice

between attorney and client is privileged rather than communication for the purposes of obtaining advice. So we think they are different to that degree, Your Honor. I'm not suggesting agreement with the state court judge's decision, I'm saying that's what he's ruled so that would create a conflict.

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THE COURT: I see. My question is not whether you disagree or agree with the state court judge. My question is whether you are asserting that the applicable law under the federal common law is different than the state law?

MR. BECK: I've got to be careful how I answer that because I've got to preserve the position I've taken in the state court. And under that position the answer would be no, but certainly the federal law is clearly under Upjohn that extends to communications to obtain legal advice not just the advice itself. And that by producing such communications there's a live issue of waiver for Your Honor that applies to the federal portion of the deposition.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Anyone else want to weigh in on that issue?

MR. DUPRE: Your Honor, in general we don't believe these questions of which law applies are dispositive, but would say that the question of whether a

party has impliedly waived its privilege is one that we believe federal common law applies to and the Court should look to federal court precedent to help decide that question.

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THE COURT: And were you all present and given an opportunity to participate when the state court judge was making his determination?

MR. BECK: The answer is yes as to us, but no as to everyone else. It was just Mr. McGahren and me in that proceeding, Your Honor.

MR. MCGAHREN: More over, Your Honor it was Mr. Beck that filed the motion in state court seeking a ruling that he's now questioning.

MR. DUPRE: Your Honor, the United States is not a party to the state court litigation, was not at the hearing, did not file anything at the hearing.

MR. SODEN: Your Honor, this is Steve Soden at Mallinckrodt, and the same applies to Mallinckrodt.

MR. GREENBERG: That is also the case, Your Honor, with EverZinc U.S.A., we were not at the hearing and we're not a party to that litigation.

THE COURT: So Mr. McGahren, I'm assuming that your position, based upon what I read in the reply, and I'm assuming that you've got a written order that is consistent with the voice mail notification that you had presented,

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necessarily our position. Our position is we wanted to have all these issues before this Court. Mr. Beck chose to file the motion that he filed in state court. The Court ruled not in his favor and now he's seeking a second determination. I'm not quite sure as to the scope of what he's seeking. It hasn't been really briefed other than he's looking for all the documents on Cotter's privilege log in the state court litigation, that's my understanding of what he's seeking here.

THE COURT: But even if I were to assert estoppel with respect to Mr. Beck, what does that have to do with the other parties who are not parties to that litigation?

MR. MCGAHREN: The other parties took different positions and some of the parties didn't take any positions at all, Your Honor, so EverZinc didn't file anything.

THE COURT: In state court?

MR. MCGAHREN: Oh, I'm talking about here, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. But some of the parties have taken positions here, for instance Mallinckrodt has filed a position here asserting waiver, correct?

MR. MCGAHREN: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And even if I were to determine that some level of estoppel would relate with respect to

Mr. Beck's clients, how would that impact the other parties who are here before this Court?

MR. MCGAHREN: I don't think it does, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: All right. But do you want to go ahead and give me that order for whatever it's worth? I mean, it appears to me that I will have to reach this issue notwithstanding that order in light of the fact that there are other parties before this Court who were not a party to this proceeding.

All right. So now that I kind of made sure that I had kind of the general lay of the land, I will hear from you Mr. McGahren.

MR. MCGAHREN: Yes, Your Honor. Like Your Honor,
I haven't had a hearing on a Rule 27 petition, although
I've filed quite a few of them over the years.

THE COURT: My first one, too.

MR. MCGAHREN: Usually people want to perpetuate testimony. This one is a little unique in that it involves a lawyer that represented Cotter Corporation. And this particular lawyer happens to be the only living witness with respect to communications with various federal agencies that occurred back in the early 1970s and related

to the disposal of material generated by the United States and Mallinckrodt that ended up in Westlake Landfill.

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The judge specifically focused in state court in his ruling on a memorandum that was prepared by Mr.

McGrath, Ed McGrath is his name. And Mr. McGrath at the time wrote a fairly contemporaneous memorandum describing the history of Cotter's relationship with the Latty Avenue site and their discussions with federal regulators.

There's only one sentence in that memo that Cotter sought to protect as attorney-client work product, it was opinion, that's what the judge focused in the state court.

THE COURT: As work product or opinion?

MR. MCGAHREN: Opinion, Your Honor. And the rest of the memorandum the judge says was not privileged or work product, it's merely a recitation of facts. As I mentioned, Your Honor, Mr. McGrath is the only living witness that can testify to these communications with various federal agencies that related to this disposal and to the decommissioning of Latty Avenue. So that's what we are seeking to preserve his testimony on. We followed the requirements of Rule 27. We have provided a declaration with the anticipated testimony. We went way beyond the requirements of Rule 27 and produced all of the documents that Cotter had produced in the McClurg litigation which was previously before Your Honor. We produced privilege

log and we've had numerous conversations with counsel about the logistics of the deposition, where it would take place. Originally we were trying to schedule it up in Maine, we're now doing it down in Florida where Mr. McGrath spends the winter. We think it will take place over two days on December 2nd and 3rd. I'm not clear what Mr. Beck's position on this, but in the state court he withdrew the portion of the motion above and beyond the memorandum. It's the subject of the order. And reserved his right to make objections after the deposition. Frankly, Your Honor, that's what I had recommended in the first place.

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THE COURT: And I wasn't really sure what that meant, and I wasn't sure what that meant in the judge's order either. So I understand that the judge here is saying that the memorandum itself is not privileged and that the attorney work product part on page four was properly redacted. And where it says here: The remainder of the motion seeking production of McGrath related documents is withdrawn.

So does that mean that vis-a-vis Mr. Beck that he was going forward with the deposition without insisting that any documents he believes -- privileged documents that he believes should be produced need to be produced in advance of the deposition?

MR. MCGAHREN: I'll let Mr. Beck speak to that.

THE COURT: I wasn't sure what that meant.

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MR. MCGAHREN: With respect to their position,
Your Honor, they filed basically the exact motion in state
and federal court.

MR. BECK: That's fair, Judge. We had filed a motion seeking production of the redacted portion of the 1975 McGrath memo, and also seeking the contemporaneous documents on Cotter's privilege log that were on presumably the same subject matter. At the hearing I made a decision to withdraw without prejudice all portions of the motion except as to the McGrath memo which Judge Walsh reviewed in camera and issued this ruling.

THE COURT: You mean with respect to the redaction?

MR. BECK: Yes, with respect to the redaction. So that was the only thing he had before him to rule.

THE COURT: So your client's position was to go forward with the deposition without attempting to obtain the privileged -- what you believed were privileged documents as to which the privilege had been waived?

MR. BECK: Correct, in the state case knowing that we were coming here, but also with specific reference at the end of this order that we may reassert the motion once we've laid a testimony of foundation at the deposition that we believe will more likely persuade Judge Walsh.

THE COURT: So honestly folks, that's one of the issues that I need to -- I mean, the main issue that I assumed was before me it was whether or not you all are seeking the production of documents in advance of the deposition or whether everybody is comfortable going forward with the deposition trying to establish what the basis is for some of the statements in the memorandum as well as in the affidavit, because in some of these I wasn't totally sure what the basis of the knowledge was or the purpose for which the communication might have taken place. And I assumed that you all would be able to establish that information at Mr. McGrath's deposition. I'm assuming and I understand that Mr. McGrath is elderly and nobody knows what's going to happen tomorrow, but to anyone's knowledge does Mr. McGrath currently have any terminal illness or anything that is going to cause concern about like his likelihood to be around after December 3rd? MR. DUPRE: Your Honor, I cannot speak to

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MR. DUPRE: Your Honor, I cannot speak to
Mr. McGrath's health, but if you would allow me to I would
like to speak to why we think these issues are appropriate
to be resolved prior to the deposition.

I think there's really two issues here. One is whether or not Cotter has already waived the attorney-client privilege with respect to the advice

Mr. McGrath gave Cotter on disposing of this radioactive

material through its voluntary production of this 1975 memorandum and the declaration that was signed last April. We would be happy to get into that in detail if the Court would like.

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In addition, we believe what Cotter is trying to do is set up an advice of counsel type defense. Indeed, this was essentially explicitly said to us that they would like to establish it through Mr. McGrath's deposition testimony that Cotter acted in good faith in depositing radioactive material at the Westlake Landfill. And while we have no objection with respect to Cotter establishing that, that opens up and waives the attorney-client privilege as to whether in fact Cotter did act in good faith and relied on its counsel's advice. In particular, because we don't know when litigation will proceed with Mr. McGrath, we don't believe it will be appropriate to wait five years to see what Cotter puts into its initial pleadings and only then figure out for sure how they intend to use his testimony.

THE COURT: Let me take this in two steps. I mean, one step is whether or not Cotter is going to assert a good faith defense based upon Mr. McGrath's advice.

MR. MCGAHREN: That's not a defense under CERCLA, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. And I assume you all can

get that position in writing or not in writing from the defendant.

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MR. DUPRE: Actually, Your Honor, my understanding is, and to be clear there's not a good faith defense to CERCLA liability, but they will be arguing with respect to an allocation of response costs that Cotter acted in good faith and that should affect the allocation of response costs. If Cotter would like to disclaim that argument now, that would be helpful.

THE COURT: So that is what I am -- it seems to me that you all ought to be able to determine at least in the near future whether or not Cotter is going to be asserting good faith with respect to allocation of response costs.

MR. MCGAHREN: Your Honor, again he was speaking to a defense that they cited with respect to the US v.

Exxon case. That is not a defense to CERCLA liability.

There are three enumerated defenses to CERCLA liability, that doesn't fall within them. So it's not even on point.

We're trying to elicit facts.

THE COURT: I understand, but does it then follow that Cotter is not making such a good faith argument?

MR. MCGAHREN: We want to use all the facts elicited in the case to develop our own inequitable allocation case. I don't know what that would be at this

point, Your Honor. I haven't gotten all the facts from all the parties. We have no discovery against the United States. We're simply trying to preserve testimony of a witness who was on the grounds --

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THE COURT: But in the context of an equitable allocation argument, would Cotter essentially be asserting an advice of counsel, effectively asserting?

MR. MCGAHREN: Not advice of counsel, no Your Honor, we would not be asserting that. We might be asserting facts obtained from Mr. McGrath.

THE COURT: I understand. And what is it that the Government believes Cotter would be arguing?

MR. MCGAHREN: Excuse me, Your Honor, one more thing I want to say. I think when the testimony is taken it will be borne out that Mr. McGrath was not involved in advising on disposal at Westlake Landfill, but that can be determined at the deposition.

MR. DUPRE: Your Honor, Cotter has set forth in both its petition and in Mr. McGrath's declaration legal conclusions by Mr. McGrath that they want to elicit at his deposition. For instance, in their petition itself in paragraph five they say: Mr. McGrath has factual knowledge of federal regulations governing the leached barium sulfate that was dumped in Latty Avenue. The petition also asserts that Mr. McGrath is going to establish based on personal

knowledge that Cotter's license with Atomic Energy

Commission allowed Cotter to dump this leach barium sulfate

at the Westlake Landfill.

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Mr. McGrath's understanding of what the law was at the time is only relevant to the extent that he advised his client, Cotter, that those activities were legal.

Obviously Mr. McGrath cannot give expert testimony as to what the law was, that is the province of the courts. If he wants to testify that he thought the disposal of leach barium sulfate at Westlake Landfill was permissible under AEC regulations, that's only relevant again if he told his client and his client relied on that. And we think that's clearly what Cotter is trying to establish here that his client worked with their counsel and acted in good faith. And we believe that it would be unfair to essentially let them hide the ball and not let us ask follow-up questions on these quote/unquote factual statements about what the law was at the time.

MR. MCGAHREN: Your Honor, there were only two documents on Cotter's privilege log that predate the disposal at Westlake Landfill that pertain to Mr. McGrath. So I just want you to be aware of that, Your Honor. But in terms of hiding the ball, Mr. McGrath is going to testify that he told the United States and the United States was fully aware of the disposal that was ongoing at Westlake

Landfill, and they don't want that to be out.

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THE COURT: All right. I don't know that I still have gotten an answer to the question that I asked. My question is what is it with respect to Cotter's announced intention to make an equitable allocation argument -- am I stating that correctly?

MR. MCGAHREN: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: What is it that the United States is claiming would give rise to a waiver of any attorney-client privilege were Mr. McGrath's testimony to be elicited?

MR. BECK: Yes, Your Honor. I think it's important to note a party can make essentially a good faith argument that they acted in good faith. And to the extent they use their counselor's testimony and advice to make that, that constitutes an implied waiver of the privilege even if it is not actually a pure defense to liability. So here, as we understand it and as I think is very clearly set forth in the declarations by Mr. McGrath, they are going to argue that Cotter, because it relied on the advice of its attorney, should have to pay less money to clean up the Westlake Landfill than other parties who are also liable at the site.

THE COURT: But that is the question that I believe you all can establish one way or the other. Now, can we all agree that one can have conversations with one's

attorney that are not privileged communications?

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MR. DUPRE: Of course, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. So an attorney may well be involved in discussions with third parties, including third party regulators?

MR. DUPRE: Correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And the discussions that that attorney has with the third party regulator, including reporting back to the client what the third party regulator said, are not privileged?

MR. DUPRE: Your Honor, I would disagree slightly on this last point. I think likely, although we don't know, when parties -- when a lawyer recounts something to his client and says I met with the regulatory agency and he didn't answer my question or whatever it is, the factual information, usually that's going to be coupled with the attorney's legal advice about that, what that statement --

either seeking to use that legal advice or not seeking to use that legal advice in connection with the defense here. So are you saying to me that if there is litigation ongoing and the client authorizes the attorney to go make a settlement -- well, to go make some form of request to the other party, and they go and make that request to the other

party, and the other party says: No. Forget it. Not doing that. And the attorney comes back and reports to the client the party said: No. Forget it. Not doing that.

That -- and they thereafter engage in a discussion about what the attorney's advice should be in light of that response. Are you telling me that the client -- the attorney's statement to the client reporting what was said is privileged? And if so, give me the case that you are relying on for that proposition because I don't buy it.

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Your Honor, generally speaking the MR. DUPRE: facts -- and I think this is something that is relevant here -- most of the substantive facts that are put forth in Mr. McGrath's declaration are actually just him citing to documents and saying this document is authentic and says what it says. We have no problem with Mr. McGrath authenticating documents, but he diverge from simply confirming the authenticity of communications with the regulator in this case, the AEC, and says for instance in paragraph four of his declaration: My review of the then existing AEC regulations combined with my years of experience in dealing with the AEC in such matters indicated that diluting the leach barium sulfate with soil to, quote, unimportant quality and quantities was permissible. And then he cites to the code of federal regulations. That statement there, which is clearly

testimony they want to elicit, is Mr. McGrath's legal opinions. And again, this information is only relevant if it was communicated to his client.

I quess to directly answer your question, I think there are some circumstances in which what -- while the underlying facts of a communication from a third party to a lawyer are clearly not privileged, I think the case law says that when a lawyer communicates that you can't sort of pick and choose the content of those communications. the lawyer is testifying as to half of his conversation with his client, I told the client X, we actually do believe that in many cases that will lead to a waiver of the second half of that conversation. But again here, I think just peaking beneath the surface of these declarations makes clear that if all Mr. McGrath is going to testify on, I was at a meeting with a third party, this third party said X, we wouldn't be here today. It is other parts of the declaration including in the 1975 memo where Mr. McGrath states, quote, that, you know, by way of commentary we note the following, and then gives -- it's on page eight.

THE COURT: It's at the end of the '75 memo.

MR. DUPRE: Again, Mr. McGrath's commentary on

24 | the facts in 1975 --

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THE COURT: Paragraph A and B at the end of page

eight.

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MR. DUPRE: Again, while it's true some of these facts in the 1975 memo we would concede, to the extent he had personal knowledge he can testify as to that. But other parts of this, including his commentary, contain privileged communications or he learned through privileged communications by his client.

So ultimately, Your Honor, we believe that if they are going to elicit testimony to argue Cotter acted in good faith relying on the advice of their attorney and that therefore they should have a lower allocation of response costs, which I think clearly they intend to do, then we should be able to ask follow-up questions and have the finding that there has been a waiver of privilege.

As to whether or not there's any harm in going ahead and taking that deposition for these next two days and then having further motions practice after that deposition --

THE COURT: Well, that is what seemed to be a better course of action to me at this moment, because -- and Mr. McGahren, I don't mean to cut you out of this discussion.

MR. MCGAHREN: I'm enjoying the discussion, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I know that this is your motion and I

am going to allow you to speak, but it seems to me that during the course of the next week or so, you all could have some discussion with respect to how Cotter intends to use the testimony of Mr. McGrath. And while I understand that you all may not get to these points for years in the litigation, presumably if Cotter makes that representation now and in some fashion limits the use of Mr. McGrath's testimony, and four years from now when it becomes relevant, if in fact Mr. McGrath is no longer available, maybe he will be available as a witness, maybe he will be here in wherever in court to testify -- please tell me it won't be here -- so maybe he will be available to testify. But if he's not, then I would presume that Cotter is going to be limited to the use of Mr. McGrath's deposition in that manner based upon the representation that it is making that everyone else is relying upon in that deposition. that's one issue.

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And if in fact when -- if Cotter is unwilling to make any such representation or the representation that

Cotter makes is something that one or more parties here

believe gives rise to a waiver akin to the type of waiver

that would occur if one had an advice of counsel defense

upon which they were relying, then we would be in a

position to address that issue. But at this moment in time

I don't know that you all have really had the discussion

necessary to get a clear picture on how Cotter intends to use the testimony and whether in fact it is willing to make a representation as to how it would use that testimony.

That's one issue.

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Second issue, it appears to me that if we were to go forward with the deposition which you all are going to do anyway on December 2nd and 3rd, correct?

MR. MCGAHREN: Yes, Your Honor.

MR. BECK: We're certainly planning to attend.

All right. It seems to me -- and I THE COURT: have personally lots of questions here. As I read through, for instance, the affidavit, there were numerous paragraphs in there where I said, okay, that is just a fact. On this day I did this. I had this conversation with a third party and this is what was said. Or I sent this letter or I received this letter. Or on date X I advised the regulators that this was what Cotter intended to do. Those are matters upon which Mr. McGrath would have personal knowledge. They would not typically fall within the attorney-client privilege, and I think his testimony with respect to those matters could be preserved.

There are other questions where, I mean, so for instance, I look at paragraph 23 of the affidavit which says to me, faced with no other viable options Cotter decided to mix the 8,700 tons of LBSR with approximately

39,000 tons of soil to dilute the amount of uranium in the total mixture to less than the regulated activities. Well, what's the basis of Mr. McGrath's knowledge on that point? What is the basis for what purpose did he obtained that knowledge? For what purpose is that information being provided in the affidavit? Those I think would be very important questions for me to have the answer to that I don't have the answer to right now, which I assume counsel would be able to determine during the course of the deposition. Which would then put us in a position to make a determination with respect to waiver, having received that information.

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MR. MCGAHREN: We're not looking to preclude any of these counsel from asking whatever questions they want, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And with that type of questioning I believe that we would have such a record just because as I go through this affidavit most of the items that I see do not cause me concern with respect to attorney-client privilege. I'm just telling you what I felt as I read it. Because they were the kind of fact -- relating of factual events that occurred that involved third parties.

MR. BECK: May I respond to that?

THE COURT: You may.

MR. BECK: We have taken the position that the

production of the 1975 memo itself is a waiver of privilege because the memorandum as a whole is an attorney-client communication. It was written by Mr. McGrath as lawyer to Mr. Marcott who is the chief decisionmaker at Cotter, his client, in 1975. So the whole document is at its essence attorney-client communication. It also recites in three separate places, which are the last paragraph on page one and the second and fourth paragraphs on page six.

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THE COURT: Let me get there. Okay. Go ahead.

MR. BECK: It also recites at the bottom of page
one a specific conversation that Mr. McGrath had with

Cotter --

THE COURT: Yes, I had noted that.

MR. BECK: -- Preliminary to -- well, presumably for the purpose of information to do his job as a lawyer. And then on page six in both the second and fourth paragraphs there's additional instances where Mr. McGrath specifically describes conversations he had with his client in this memorandum. So the memorandum contains attorney-client discussions, at least those three. I would say it contains others where he couldn't be reciting what Cotter knew, felt, believed, or why it did something unless his client told him that, so inherently those are attorney-client communication.

The entire body of that was incorporated into an

attorney-client communication that Cotter voluntarily produced, which is the memo. And then the memo was adopted in paragraphs 35 and 36 of the declaration in 2019 as an accurate expression of what had occurred in this time frame between the late 1960s and early 1970s when Cotter made the decision to send licensed atomic material to my client's landfill.

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And so all of that we think constitutes a waiver. And all of those communications including the ones factual are part of an ongoing conversation so that Mr. McGrath can work with them on the question of whether or not this supposed dilution to below what he called a regulated quantity or regulated threshold under the Atomic Energy Act, it was all part of that conversation, which inherently was advice. So we think there's been a waiver now. We also think, as Your Honor does, there'd be a much better record on the issue after the deposition. And it's perfectly fair with me if Your Honor prefers to reserve the issue for then.

I would ask for two things in that respect, and one is, just so the Court retains jurisdiction to decide it, and the Court provides that if Your Honor determines that based on the total of what we have now plus what we have at the deposition, there's something new that should be disclosed to us from the privilege log, then we'd have

the opportunity to ask Mr. McGrath questions about that.

His deposition wouldn't be closed until that determination had been made one way or the other. No motion or denied motion or granted motion, and we finish the deposition.

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THE COURT: Mr. McGahren, does Cotter have any objection to proceeding in that fashion?

MR. MCGAHREN: Just a question. What if he dies before the next proceeding?

THE COURT: Then you all will have to make a determination, some judge some day will have to make a determination with respect to whether that deposition can be used or not, because that would require -- if you all moved forward with the understanding that you would expeditiously make whatever additional record you wanted to make following his deposition so that any follow up would occur again promptly. But if in fact he died before that then I would, if everybody agreed, that I would have the ability to do the follow up, I wouldn't be able to make a determination with respect to whether there has been a waiver. If there has been a waiver, then Cotter would have to produce additional materials to the parties. other day some judge who is involved in your litigation, which hopefully will not be me, will make the determination with respect to whether the deposition of that absent party can or cannot be used.

MR. MCGAHREN: And if I can understand a little 1 more from Mr. Beck, the deposition will clear up just what 2 3 he said. Basically what he was talking about was advice 4 with respect to disposal of materials in Westlake Landfill 5 proactively. I think the deposition will clear that up. MR. BECK: And I just wish, Your Honor, to hold 6 7 the deposition open and not conclude it if there is a 8 motion filed to be filed, which is normally the typical procedure. 9 Right. And that's really the issue 10 THE COURT: is whether Cotter and the other parties here are agreeable 11 12 to proceeding in that fashion. 13 MR. MCGAHREN: With respect to the scope of the 14 waiver that Mr. Beck is seeking, at this point I'm a little confused. 15 16 The scope of the waiver? THE COURT: 17 MR. MCGAHREN: The scope of waiver that he laid 18 out in his papers. 19 THE COURT: Well, I think Mr. Beck's position is that by disclosing this 1975 memorandum which he believes 20 21 is advice of counsel, true? 22 MR. BECK: Yes. 2.3 That the attorney-client privilege THE COURT:

with respect to at least -- now you all know the facts here

and I don't -- but at least with respect to clean up Latty

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Avenue storage site, would be waived.

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MR. BECK: I would say it's broader than that because the memo despite its title discusses the propriety of sending the leach barium sulfate residue and dirt to my client's landfill, the Westlake Landfill. That's part of the subject matter of the memo, that's part of the subject matter we say is waived.

THE COURT: But I understand that you all would be going forward and taking the deposition to establish some of this information on a more micro level?

MR. BECK: Correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: The who, the what, the where, the why, the how, and then present both the large and the smaller privilege potential waiver issues to me.

MR. BECK: Correct, Your Honor.

MR. MCGAHREN: I just want to be clear that the scope he is seeking is limited to Mr. McGrath's communication with Cotter.

THE COURT: I don't know if that's true or not.

I don't know. I mean, the question is if Mr. McGrath, if
you have waived the attorney-client privilege with respect
to a particular issue, I don't know that it would
necessarily be a single attorney specific. I think that
would really depend upon what was going on and how defined
different parties' roles were. I don't know that I can

categorically say yes or no. 2 MR. MCGAHREN: The papers that were submitted he 3 was seeking the 40 documents off the privilege log that was 4 provided. 5 THE COURT: And I'm assuming that those included documents that were not with respect to Mr. McGrath? 6 7 are those all McGrath documents? 8 MR. MCGAHREN: They're not all McGrath documents. 9 MR. BECK: I think actually we were looking for the 40 documents of more than 40 on the privilege log that 10 did involve Mr. McGrath. But I agree with Your Honor that 11 12 if there is a waiver it goes to the subject matter which may not be limited to a single witness. 13 14 THE COURT: It may or may not be? 15 MR. BECK: May or may not. 16 THE COURT: But right now I don't know what 17 Mr. Beck's (sic) statement is with respect to the scope of 18 the privilege. 19 MR. MCGAHREN: We have his brief, Your Honor. That's what we know. 20 All right. And does that affect your 21 THE COURT: 22 determination with respect to whether to proceed? 2.3 MR. MCGAHREN: We want to proceed, Your Honor. 24 THE COURT: Okay. You do want to proceed 25 regardless?

MR. MCGAHREN: Yes, and he can raise his issues after the deposition.

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THE COURT: All right. So I encourage you all to have discussions with one another with respect to how Cotter anticipates it would use the testimony of Mr. McGrath.

MR. MCGAHREN: Your Honor, just so it's absolutely clear, we would be using it in the CERCLA cases which we signed tolling agreements for. We're not relying on advice of counsel defense because that's just not a defense to CERCLA liaility in any form I've ever heard of. I've never even heard of anyone asserting it in a CERCLA case. And there's toxic tort cases out there as well, Your Honor, the Strong case.

THE COURT: The United States is clearly unsatisfied by this statement by you, and so I am going to --

MR. MCGAHREN: He went into equitable allocation, which is not a defense. Equitable allocation is a very broad topic which is left to the discretion of the district court judge who could apply equitable factors in determining parties' respective shares of responsibility. And that involves the facts and we are trying to elicit the facts.

THE COURT: All right. I understand. But if the

facts also include that Mr. McGrath told me this was okay, right?

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MR. MCGAHREN: I don't think that's going to be the case.

THE COURT: That's why I want you all to talk about it. All right. I want you all to have that discussion so that --

MR. MCGAHREN: He's going to testify that he told the United States --

THE COURT: -- So that the United States can have -- can be in a position to make a legal argument, if it chooses to, that use of that testimony -- and I think we would all be better advised with respect to that argument once we know what the testimony is. Now, we know more than we usually know because we have this affidavit and we have this memorandum.

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$ MCGAHREN: And all the documents that most of them say Mr. McGrath on them.

THE COURT: And so I want you all to speak with one another about how Cotter intends to use the testimony. And if that leaves open questions by the United States then you can ask Mr. McGrath those questions, and presumably you all can reach some level of definition as to how the testimony is going to be used, at least by the plaintiff. You all may decide you have your own uses of that testimony

as well. And then you would be able to make any additional waiver argument that you would, such that, well if the defendant, if Cotter uses the testimony in this way that's fine, but if Cotter attempts to use the testimony in this way, we believe that would constitute a waiver which would allow us to see further documentation and ask further questions of Mr. McGrath with respect to these matters. If Cotter says I'm not doing that, then that could be stated on the record and presumably would constitute a limitation of Cotter's use of it, and we wouldn't have to get into those other issues. Is that fair or am I missing something?

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MR. BECK: That is a good application of the fairness doctrine which is what I think we're talking about here. If they use attorney-client communication as a sword they can't use them as a shield is the way put by some courts. I just want to make sure that I'm on record saying I agree with Mr. Dupre, that in an equitable allocation proceeding among the three parties the United States has identified as potentially liable to clean up the Westlake site who are Cotter Corporation, Bridgeton Landfill, and Mr Dupre's client, the United States Department of Energy fault is an important factor. And Cotter might assert, would be expected to assert that it acted in good faith and was not at fault based on largely on what Mr. McGrath may

says in the declaration, in the memo, and may say at deposition --

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THE COURT: But can we reach an understanding that if the reason Cotter is relying on what Mr. McGrath says at his deposition is because Mr. McGrath testifies I told the regulators X, Y and Z. We thereafter proceeded in that fashion and no regulator ever came to me and told me that was a problem, or regulator told me, oh, okay, that that is different than Mr. McGrath saying, look, I've looked at all these regulations and I think this is okay for you to do.

MR. BECK: The discussion with the regulator's entirely unprivileged, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. So, I don't think we know exactly what Mr. McGrath is going to say. If I am understanding Mr. McGahren correctly, and I have a lot of leaps here since I've hardly permitted him to speak, his position is that Cotter is relying on nonprivileged facts.

MR. MCGAHREN: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Is that correct?

MR. MCGAHREN: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And so after that deposition is taken, I think that you all will be in a better position to look at what has been offered and say is this what you're

relying on, because if so, we don't know the basis for it, or whatever the problem may be.

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MR. BECK: Yes, Your Honor, that's better.

If I may, Your Honor, generally I MR. DUPRE: take the approach you've laid out is a good one. I think one of the big issues for the United States -- and to be clear I also represent EPA in this matter as well with my colleague David Dain on the phone -- is that we really are to be perfectly honest unclear as to how Cotter intends to use the testimony it elicits later and brought this because we thought it was unclear of the petition. And one thing that I think could be helpful, while I don't think we need any sort of orders from the Court, I think if Cotter could commit here to, for instance, sending us a letter by Wednesday saying we intend to use Mr. McGrath's testimony to support the following arguments or however they intend to use it would be helpful to make sure we have that back and forth before the depositions start six days from now.

MR. MCGAHREN: I can't predict the future, Your Honor, I just can't do that. I don't know what lawsuits the United States is going to file. All we're looking to get out of this deposition is facts from the only witness who talked to the regulators at the time period of interest.

THE COURT: I understand what you're saying, but

again I think that would be easier for the parties to attempt to address after the deposition's been taken.

MR. DUPRE: Understood, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

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MR. BECK: I agree, Your Honor. I have one other point when we get done with all the points we're talking about.

THE COURT: So what I would like to do is for you you all to go forward and take this deposition. And I assume that Cotter is going to permit -- so for example, some of the things that we have talked about. So in paragraph 21 where he says this was the first time Cotter learned of AEC's policy. I assume that Cotter is going to permit counsel to ask Mr. McGrath what the basis is of that statement.

MR. MCGAHREN: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Because if the basis of that statement is, well, based upon all my conversations with Cotter that we were having are X, Y, Z, there may be different waiver analysis than otherwise.

MR. MCGAHREN: Your Honor, my concern is there's going to be a battery of lawyers asking this 86 plus year old man questions. They are going to have a full and fair opportunity to ask questions. We've laid out the anticipated testimony which is what we are required to do

under Rule 27. We can deal with any follow-up issues after.

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that's why I've been trying to focus on the affidavit more than the memo, because there are statements in this affidavit most of which caused me no concern. But there are statements in this affidavit that do cause me some concern with respect to attorney-client privilege issues. And I would be in a better position to analyze whether there is or is not a waiver once I hear the testimony. And I'm assuming that when you say you have laid out the testimony you expect to elicit, that that is the testimony as contained in this affidavit?

MR. MCGAHREN: Your Honor, that's the witness's declaration.

THE COURT: Right. And so that has already been produced to the parties and presumably Cotter has already had a full and fair opportunity to review that affidavit and made a determination before it was produced that it didn't believe that the attorney-client privilege was being waived --

MR. MCGAHREN: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: $\ensuremath{\text{--}}$ By any of the statements in that.

MR. MCGAHREN: I don't decide that issue, Your

Honor, but we did review it.

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Statements in here that you know nobody is going to have a problem with saying that on X date I sent this letter to the regulator and this is a true and correct copy of that letter. I assume that we're not going to have any issues with respect to that and that it is very appropriate for Cotter to be attempting to elicit this testimony because it may be the only way to properly establish the foundation for some of these records at this stage. And I assume that there will not be any unreasonable intense grilling of Mr. McGrath with respect to that.

MR. BECK: I'll go you one further, Your Honor, and say that if at the end of the deposition, which is two days, if Mr. McGahren feels somebody has abused
Mr. McGrath, to bring it to the Court's attention with a motion to terminate or limit.

THE COURT: Well, you all always know you have that opportunity.

MR. BECK: We won't.

MR. MAGAHREN: I don't think that's going to be an issue here, Your Honor

THE COURT: No, I don't either. I mean, honestly you all are professionals and I'm assuming that we are all mindful of the context here and of the witness, and that

there are paragraphs in this affidavit that I believe reasonably give rise to follow-up questioning to determine the source or the information or the purpose so that the parties can make whatever fair arguments with respect to waiver of the privilege that they wish to make.

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MR. GREENBERG: We agree, I think, on the approach. We probably agree also on the general rule in terms of the communications. But when you look at the declaration, as you've pointed out, there are some paragraphs here that cry out for attorney-client information. And I specifically want to direct the Court to paragraph 24 when Mr. McGrath states that he understood that mixing toxic, hazardous, radioactive material with soil was appropriate under the rules. What it doesn't say, of course, is whether he communicated that information to anyone. And we will be asking those questions and Mr. McGahren may well be asserting attorney-client privilege at that point and we'll be back here on that very issue.

THE COURT: Well, and that could be and that's why I thought we would be in a better position to make a determination with respect to some of these. Because there are a few statements in here that -- in the affidavit, just so that I'm clear -- where I asked myself, so is Mr. McGrath purporting to testify as an expert witness.

And if what Mr. McGrath is offering here is an opinion based upon his knowledge, but he was not retained by Cotter to make that assessment for Cotter, he was retained rather to have these communications, and this is his opinion but he was not retained by Cotter to offer that opinion and did not offer that opinion to Cotter, we have a very different analysis of the issue then if in fact he arrived at that opinion and shared that opinion with Cotter prior to these actions being taken by Cotter. Because if what it is is an expert opinion that he has come to now, then some judge later can decide whether Mr. McGrath has been properly noticed as an expert witness and whether that expert opinion should be permitted.

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If instead these are opinions that Mr. McGrath was retained to reached and he shared those opinions with Cotter, we may have a very different analysis with respect to privilege, and then there may well be a waiver and the scope of that waiver is something we will have to determine. All right?

MR. GREENBERG: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And I can't tell from paragraph 24 where he says that my review of the regulations combined with this indicated that diluting that was permissible.

MR. GREENBERG: Frankly, if it's his opinion and it's not communicated to anyone, it's irrelevant. But the

questions at the deposition are going to go to whom he communicated that with. If Mr. McGahren then asserts attorney-client privilege, we will be back on that issue, obviously.

THE COURT: Except if the only person he communucated it to was the regulator, then that's not a waiver either.

MR. GREENBERG: Correct.

THE COURT: All right.

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MR. MCGAHREN: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Now Mr. McGahren, I haven't let you talk very much and sometimes that's a wise thing to do, but is there anything you wish to offer further?

MR. MCGAHREN: Not at this time, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So my understanding is that the parties are going to proceed with this deposition on the dates scheduled. And that the parties will all conduct themselves very professionally, and will not be unnecessarily quizzing Mr. McGrath with respect to matters that are simply fact matters, but that the parties will not be prevented during this deposition to the extent they are being faced with things like paragraph 24 or paragraph 23 from inquiring as to the basis of the opinion reached. For instance, what was the source of the information? Was that

from the client and for what purpose was it obtained? Or, the nature of how certain matters were communicated to the client; in other words, was this opinion in paragraph 24 related to the client, and if so, when and how and for what purpose so far as Mr. McGrath understood. Is that fair, Mr. McGahren?

MR. MCGAHREN: I'm fully expecting that. Thank you.

THE COURT: Now you had another matter $\operatorname{Mr.}$ Beck.

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MR. BECK: I do have one, Your Honor. And certainly, let me say that we don't regard ourselves as bound to limit ourselves to the information Cotter seeks. We intend to ask Mr. McGrath about other things that he knows personally about the case that are unprivileged, but if we ask any questions that come across as difficult questions, we will certainly ask them cheerfully and professionally and be very nice to Mr. McGrath when we do it.

I do have a question about the sequence for the deposition, Judge. I've never had a Rule 27 hearing either because I've always entered into agreements with opposing counsel in every one. Often in a case like this where the other side has unique access to the witness and I cannot contact the witness about the subject matter of his

testimony, it's been agreed to by the parties to have a essentially discovery deposition for some limited period of time at first, and then the preservation testimony with a much more limited cross-examination than the deposition testimony would have been, knowing that that deposition will be used in a trial, or in multiple trials perhaps. And we had set this up in that way in October when this deposition was first going to be scheduled. Mr. McGrath was made available.

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THE COURT: You mean with respect to the state case?

MR. BECK: It was at least in respect to the state case, there was some discussion, I don't know if the United States had been involved yet or not. But we subpoenaed Mr. McGrath for the day before the day Cotter wanted to depose him. The subpoena was served in Maine and is not operative in Florida by any means. But what I'm asking for, Your Honor, is to consider since Rule 27 gives Your Honor control over the manner in taking the deposition in whatever way Your Honor believes is reasonable, we would ask that you allow the parties who haven't had a chance to talk to Mr. McGrath to ask their discovery questions first, and then let Mr. McGahren or his partner, whomever takes the deposition, preserve the testimony, and let the cross-examination come in on a crisper more brief way. I

don't think the overall deposition will be lengthened, it would be shortened, but the defense will ask better questions that are more useful if it's done that way, and that's the way I've had it done every other time and it's the way we had set up when we were going to do it in Maine in October. So that's our reqest that the parties appearing at the deposition, other than Cotter, be able to ask some questions first before we start the preservation deposition.

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MR. MCGAHREN: Yes, Your Honor. And what I would suggest is that they do that on day one. We want to start out with a fresh witness, because we are taking a trial deposition, on day two.

MR. BECK: That's perfect.

THE COURT: Everybody agreeable to that?

MR. DUPRE: My apologies. I'm a little confused. So Mr. McGahren, are you fine with Bridgeton taking a deposition -- excuse me, a fact deposition first?

MR. MCGAHREN: I said what I said, which is day one he can take a discovery deposition, everyone can ask their discovery questions. Day two, I want to start with the witness fresh, first thing in the morning.

MR. BECK: Thank you for that clarification.

THE COURT: So day one would be discovery deposition; day two would be the deposition for purpose of

preserving the testimony, with the understanding that the deposition would potentially remain open for the parties to come and tell me, based upon the record that is developed at the deposition, why additional information or testimony is appropriate.

MR. BECK: Of course.

THE COURT: Does that work for everyone?

MR. MCGAHREN: Yes, Your Honor.

MR. DUPRE: Yes, Your Honor.

MR. BECK: Thank you.

THE COURT: Anyone on the telephone want to weigh

in?

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MR. SODEN: Your Honor, just fact checking a little bit. Was it the Court's understanding that the parties are going to talk this week before the deposition to try to define Cotter's use for this testimony, or have we passed by that?

THE COURT: Well, I encourage you all to have that discussion because I think that the other parties here who are listed as the defendants in this matter, you ought to sit down with Cotter and have a discussion and say are you seeking to do this, are you seeking to do that, because Cotter may or may not be in a position to say, no, to some of those things which may cause the parties to have more comfort with respect to the future use of the deposition.

If Cotter's response is, I don't know, I can't tell you that, then I suggest you all are going to have to go forward with the deposition and that you all will be free to make whatever arguments you are seeking to make to me and/or the state court judge after this deposition has been taken. And some day if and when it is relevant and someone is seeking to use this deposition, other issues can be determined at that time depending upon what purpose the deposition is being offered for at that time. Because all I would be looking at is whether we have a waiver, which is going to subject Cotter to making further disclosure to the parties. I am not going to limit the subject matter of that deposition for any future trial unless you all agree to that limitation, in which case I will memorialize your stipulation. But the use to which that deposition can be put at a future date is going to be a decision that that judge is going to make on that future date. I will not place any limitation on the use of the deposition at this point in time. I will simply be making a determination whether a full and fair opportunity to depose the witness has been provided.

MR. BECK: Thank you.

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THE COURT: Does that make sense?

MR. MCGAHREN: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: I know there was a -- so to the

extent anyone is asking me to limit it, I'm not going to do so at this point because I don't think that that is my job at this point. I think you all have a pretty clear indication and a pretty full record of the subject matter of the deposition and the questioning that Cotter intends to ask. So I don't think that anybody can claim surprise with respect to that.

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MR. SODEN: Your Honor, thank you for that clarification. This is Steve Soden again. But to be clear on the operation of Rule 27, the deposition for future use in federal cases is not limited to the Cotter petition and the facts alleged in there.

THE COURT: I'm sorry, I have to tell you that I didn't quite hear all that you said. So if I could get you to repeat it, please.

MR. SODEN: Okay. Just because it is a Rule 27 and they have filed a petition outlining the facts to elicit, that the deposition itself in future federal court should be limited to the petition, the facts alleged in the petition.

MR. MCGAHREN: Does that mean you are taking the position Mallinckrodt couldn't use it for anything else?

MR. SODEN: The deposition itself limited to and for use in future federal court proceedings, then the Rule 27 should be limited to the petition.

MR. MCGAHREN: The rule speaks to reasonable uses, and as I said, Your Honor, I can't predict the future. We do have two tolling agreements which we disclosed in our petition that have been entered into the United States, one of which deals with claims under CERCLA for Latty Avenue, and the other which deals with claims under CERCLA for Westlake Landfill. So we know about those. We've also identified that there are toxic tort cases, numerous toxic tort cases out there, including some before Your Honor. So we have disclosed everything that we know and I believe the rule is confined to using it for reasonable uses and I think we've been reasonable in our disclosure.

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MR. SODEN: Your Honor, Rule 27 explicitly by its terms applies only to cases not yet filed. So as far as the toxic tort cases out there, other than Strong, would not apply, would not apply to McClurg. The first line of Rule 27 puts McClurg outside the scope of anything that's going on here.

THE COURT: And I have to tell you folks, you are referencing an issue that I have not looked at so I'm not sure I understand what the issue is.

MR. MCGAHREN: It wasn't raised in Mallinckrodt's papers. They sought to preclude the use of the deposition against Mallinckrodt in their papers, so I'm hearing this

for the first time as well, Your Honor. I'm not quite 2 sure --3 To be clear, all I'm asking is in MR. SODEN: 4 response to the Court's statement that she's not going to 5 put limits on the deposition, is that the deposition for any future use in federal court is limited to the petition 6 7 filed under Rule 27 because that's how it works. You file 8 your petition and say this is what it's going to be about 9 and that's what allows you to perpetuate the testimony in what would otherwise be a very unfair situation. 10 So you give everybody the facts and go take your deposition based 11 12 on those facts, and then its future use is limited to the scope of that petition. 13 14 THE COURT: The scope of what petition? The Rule 26 (sic) petition? 15 16 MR. SODEN: Yeah, Cotter's Rule 27 petition. Sets forth their alleged facts for the Basis of 17 18 perpetuating the testimony. It's in paragraph 6 of their 19 Rule 27 petition. 20 MR. MCGAHREN: He said paragraph 26? 21 THE COURT: Paragraph 6 of the Rule 27, so 22 document number one, paragraph 6. 2.3 MR. MCGAHREN: Okay. The petition also mentions

MR. SODEN: The petition mentions the Strong

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the Strong case.

case, but we're here on Rule 27 and perpetuating the testimony for future use in federal court. And Rule 27(a)(1)(A) says that the petition must state that the petitioner expects to be a party to an action recognizable in a United States Court but cannot presently bring it or cause it to be brought. Does not apply to pending actions.

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MR. MCGAHREN: There is another case, Your Honor, which is currently in mediation and we have signed a mediation agreement. This involves the tolled claims by the United States for the Westlake Landfill. Mr. Beck's client has also brought a contribution action which has been swept under conundrum of that mediation where Bridgeton Landfill sued Mallinckrodt and EverZinc for contribution under CERCLA. My client, Cotter, is not currently a party to that litigation, but we would certainly seek to use the deposition if we did join that litigation after the mediation concludes in one manner or another. But I don't know, Your Honor, what lawsuits are going to happen in the future. I'm only aware of the existing actions, and we've done the best we can to identify reasonable uses of the deposition which is what Rule 27 requires.

THE COURT: Are there particular topics that you intend to inquire with respect to Mr. McGrath that are not

listed in the petition?

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MR. MCGAHREN: I think the facts are basically the same, Your Honor, it's just that they might get transposed and used differently in different litigations depending on the legal issues.

THE COURT: Do you feel that the petition that you have filed with respect to the Rule 27 -- does Cotter have any problem being limited to what is in the Rule 27 petition to the extent that that position is being used in future federal action?

MR. MCGAHREN: So long as that's how all parties are limited. We've laid out what the facts were that this witness was going to testify to to the best of our ability. At the deposition there may be questions asked.

THE COURT: I mean, Mr. Soden, I feel like there's something else going on here that you know about that I don't know about. And honestly, I do not understand what the purpose of this questioning is, and I feel like maybe I'm in the position of getting sandbagged here and I don't want that to happen.

MR. SODEN: No, I'm not trying --

THE COURT: I don't get it. I don't get what we're talking about. My understanding here is that Cotter has requested to take this deposition. It has in a fair amount of detail laid out the topics that it intends to

Those topics are further elucidated in the explore. affidavit that was filed that everybody is going to be free to inquire about. And it's my understanding that this deposition will also be taken for a second purpose which is for use in the Strong case. I don't know diddly squat about the Strong case. I do not know what the issues are I do not know how those issues may diverge from the issues that are raised in this petition. But my understanding is that the parties anticipated that both -that Mr. McGrath would be -- the parties would be seeking testimony with respect to both matters. And so I'm assuming unless somehow the Strong case is identical to these hypothetical cases that maybe have not been filed yet, that there may be topics that are inquired about that are relevant to the Strong case that would otherwise not have been detailed in the Rule 27 petition. And are we going to sit around and be parsing every question as it is asked to make that determination?

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MR. SODEN: No, Your Honor. I'm not trying to sandbag, I'm not trying to clog up the works. They could very well be relevant in Strong that are not covered by the Rule 27 petition. That would not be grounds for an objection to a deposition being taken in Strong, I suppose. I'm just talking about the operation of Rule 27 and its perpetration of testimony for future use in federal court.

So if that did happen, there are questions outside the bounds of the petition, that would be testimony that would not carry forward under Rule 27 and be able to be used against the parties who have been noticed up in this proceeding. Because I'm not a part of Strong either --

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THE COURT: Mr. Soden, why don't you tell me a hypothetical question that you are concerned about. I just --

MR. SODEN: For example, anything about

Mallinckrodt, my client, there is nothing in the petition

about that. I don't know if people are going to ask

Mr. McGrath about Mallinckrodt, but that's not part of the

petition and that should not be part of any testimony that

is perpetuated.

MR. MCGAHREN: I think the petition does mention Mallinckrodt, but I don't believe that that's going to be a subject of this witness's knowledge.

THE COURT: Well, Mr. Soden, I'm going to assume that we're not going to have a whole lot of irrelevant questions asked here, but as you know, this deposition is being taken for the purpose of preserving testimony.

Nobody is making a determination as to its use now. And if in fact there is questioning that takes place that you believe is reasonably outside the scope of the Strong litigation and outside the scope of the Rule 27 petition,

then I suggest that you make an objection to preserve it for the record. And some day some judge will determine whether that was a good objection and whether that testimony will be permitted.

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MR. SODEN: Thank you, Your Honor. I was just mainly wanting to clarify their comments about no limitations.

MR. MCGAHREN: There are other litigations out there, Your Honor, that we haven't been named in these litigations. There's a Kitchin lawsuit that has been brought against Mr. Beck's client, or at least some of them, for Westlake Landfill, which was remanded to state court, is now before the Eighth Circuit on a limited issue that I can't speak to. We haven't been joined in that case. It may end up in federal court, it may end up in state court, I just don't know, Your Honor, I can't predict that.

THE COURT: All right. As you stand here today, are there issues with respect to Mallinckrodt that you anticipate asking Mr. McGrath?

MR. MCGAHREN: I don't think Mr. McGrath knows anything about Mallinckrodt other than the fact that they generated all the waste at issue.

THE COURT: And I saw reference to that in the affidavit.

MR. MCGAHREN: Yes, Your Honor. It's identified.

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THE COURT: So that fact has been stated in the affidavit that Mr. McGrath may or may not be asked about. But in the event that Cotter intends to ask some line of questions with respect to Mallinckrodt, I am going to ask Cotter to disclose the line of questioning that it intends to ask in advance of the deposition. Any problem with that?

MR. MCGAHREN: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Does that take care of you Mr. Soden?

MR. SODEN: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you.

ability to make an objection. You all will be free to preserve your objections for the record so that some judge some day can make a determination whether that question and answer will be permitted to be offered to the jury. Okay?

MR. SODEN: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. Now, after this deposition is taken I assume that you all will be in a position to have some sense of the issues that you may want still to present to me, if at all. And so please then communicate with one another with respect to those issues and try to reach an agreement with respect to any further briefing and the schedule for that further briefing, and

hopefully present that to me. If there are aspects of it that you can agree to and others not, then set that out. If it would be helpful for us to have some form of conference call in advance of you all moving forward, we can do that.

I will tell you I'm scheduled to be in meetings in Washington the third, fourth, and fifth of December, so I will not be available those days. I think we have hearings in McClurg on the sixth, so I'll be seeing at least some of you then. And, you know, I'll be back available after that, but do not assume you will be able to reach me on the third, fourth, or fifth of December. But if it would be helpful to you all to have some sort of conference call to discuss how to proceed, feel free to call my assistant and set that up. And otherwise, please do attempt to agree on some form of briefing schedule if there is anything further, and if you all decide as a holiday present to me that there is nothing further that you need from me, please let me know that as well.

MR. MCGAHREN: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you all. Anything further from anyone on the phone? All right. I'm going to take that as a no. And we will be adjourned. Thank you.

(COURT ADJOURNED AT 5:50)

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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

I, Patti Dunn Wecke, Registered Merit Reporter, hereby certify that I am a duly appointed official court reporter of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri.

I further certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate transcript of the proceedings held in the entitled cause, and a true and correct transcription of my stenographic notes.

I further certify that this transcript, containing pages 1 - 58 inclusive, was delivered electronically and that this reporter takes no responsibility for missing or altered pages of this transcript when same transcript is copied by any party other than this reporter.

Dated at St. Louis, Missouri, this 30th day of November, 2019.

/s/Patti Dunn Wecke, RMR, CRR, CMRS Official Reporter